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Army Expansibility

Expanding Brigade Combat Teams:
Is the Training Base Adequate?
Esli T. Pitts
ABSTRACT: Given our poor track record of predicting the nature
of the wars that have transpired since Vietnam, this article describes
a model for transitioning the current Army into a force that might
be needed in the event of a great power war.

I

n a world where America, its allies, and its partners do not maintain
large standing armies, our potential enemies still believe in maximizing military strength. In March 2016, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
“distinct challenge to our national security” posed by Russia, China,
North Korea, and Iran, who continue “invest[ing] in military capabilities
that reduce our competitive advantage.”1 Much of this investment is in the
form of modernized conventional warfighting capabilities. In February
2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed “when it comes
to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements,
since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten
it right.”2 He then warned of the challenge of justifying the expense of a
larger force given the decreasing likelihood of a “head-on clash of large
mechanized armies.”3 Contrast this statement with Secretary Rumsfeld,
who famously observed that countries go to war with the armies they
have, not the armies they need.4
This article considers how, in the event of a great-power war such
as the one Gates discounted, the United States might transition from
the Army it has, to the one it might need, by doubling the building
blocks of Army units, brigade combat teams (BCTs), with particular
focus on armored BCTs. The article discusses key training requirements
and offers recommendations for simplifying Army expansion, should it
become necessary.5
Despite several historical examples of Army expansion since
World War II, doubling the number of BCTs is complex and without
modern parallel. Within current infrastructure, the Army could double
the number of trained BCTs, but to do so rapidly would be extremely
challenging. Unless the Army significantly changes end-strength and
training capacity in the generating force, imposes stop-loss, assumes
1      Hearing on the Department of Defense Budget Posture, Before the Senate Armed Service Committee, 114th
Cong. (March 17, 2016) (posture statement of General Joseph Dunford Jr., US Marine Corps,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
2      Robert M. Gates (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 25, 2011).
3      Ibid.
4      Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” New York Times,
December 8, 2004.
5      The goal of doubling the Army’s BCTs was chosen arbitrarily; some scenarios would require
more, some less.
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significant risk with inexperienced leadership, and increases stocks of
ready equipment, the ability to generate trained brigades will be limited
to a largely sequential and time-consuming process.

Training an Expanding Army

In January 2016, the Congressionally mandated National
Commission on the Future of the Army warned “significant reductions
in the size of the generating force put the ability to expand the Army
at risk.”6 The Commission noted that there was no link between the
size of the generating force, any anticipated Total Army Analysis need
for an expansible Army, nor a requirement for the generating force to
support expansibility.7 In other words, the lynchpin of expansibility is
insufficient, and there is no plan to address it.
The Army must, therefore, consider its goals carefully and align the
Total Army Analysis process to right-sizing the generating force—even
if the goal is not to double brigades but to reach a specified planned
capability. The Army grew by 16,000 soldiers in Fiscal Year 2017 through
a combination of increased recruiting and higher retention of senior
soldiers.8 Some portion of that growth may go into the generating force,
but the damage caused by the recent loss of trained leadership who could
support future expansibility is already done.
The Fiscal Year 2017 Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment adopted a triangular brigade structure for the armored BCT
(4,184 soldiers) with three maneuver battalions and a cavalry squadron.
Each of the maneuver battalions has a headquarters company and
three line companies. Two of the battalions are tank-heavy and one is
infantry-heavy. The cavalry squadron is comprised of a headquarters,
three reconnaissance troops, and a tank troop.9 About 35 percent of
the brigade combat team (1,479 soldiers) are so-called trigger-pullers,
including 355 tankers, 340 scouts, and 667 infantry, and 117 armor or
infantry officers.10 The remaining soldiers in the brigade require a similar
training process, but analyzing it is outside the parameters of this article.
Doubling the Army’s armored BCTs would require the Army to
train a high volume of soldiers. With attrition at 12–14 percent during
initial entry and 12 percent during unit training, 15 new armored brigade
combat teams would require about 27,700 tankers, scouts, and infantry.
The remaining infantry and Stryker brigades could require roughly
100,000 more soldiers.11 Despite the seeming simplicity, the following
approaches entail a high degree of friction.
A modern BCT is much more complicated than a brigade of the early
2000s. Likewise, training and education requirements are much more
6      Carter F. Ham et al., National Commission on the Future of the Army: Report to the President and
Congress of the United States (Arlington, VA: National Commission on the Future of the Army,
2016), 57.
7       Ibid.
8      Tom Vanden Brook, “Army To Spend $300 Million on Bonuses and Ads To Get 6,000 More
Recruits,” USA Today, February 12, 2017.
9      FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and subordinate units).
10      Ibid.
11      Given ongoing force structure changes, including adding additional infantry battalions to
overseas infantry brigade combat teams, the number of 100,000 is more of an informed estimate
than based on Force Management System’s specific data.
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demanding. Missions and operating environments can also be more
complex, and unit cohesion and proficiency can take years to develop
fully.12 Despite these factors and the specialized training required for
large subsets of the Army, the following model, derived from historical
examples, can serve as a starting point for producing new brigades.13 In
this model, the Army identifies the manning requirements, establishes
dates, or aimpoints, for forming the new brigade and schedules
institutional training to prepare new recruits and cadre to join soldiers
who already meet those requirements at the unit’s formation. This
theoretical capacity is subject to filling initial training courses, procuring
required equipment, and assembling cadres of mid- and senior- grade
leaders to reach the aimpoint.
Institutional training involves basic and specialized instruction for
large cohorts of recruits and leaders. Assuming brigades are formed on a
sequential and consistent timeline, trained soldiers can also be provided
on a predictable schedule with limited difficulty. The more rapidly
brigades must be built, however, the more the current infrastructure
will be challenged. Moreover, a significant amount of centralized
management will be required to balance education with tactical or
technical skills during expansion efforts.
A key consideration, the total quantity of soldiers required, varies
based upon the assumption that a stop-loss will accompany any event
that leads to doubling the force. Therefore, unless the Army is in active
combat, the primary problem is filling the ranks of new units, not
replacing combat losses or soldiers whose term of service has expired.
A 25 percent overage for training would offset historical rates of
attrition during both initial training and after forming brigades. But,
this allocation does not consider replacing significant combat losses.
Were it necessary, the training requirement would rapidly consume
not only the overage but also a potentially high percentage of training
capacity. Accounting only for attrition during training, an armored BCT
would require the following enlisted soldiers (E1–E4): 186 tankers, 229
scouts, and 413 infantry. Sergeant (E5) requirements would include 87
tankers, 52 scouts, and 135 infantry. With overage, the brigade would
require 1,035 junior enlisted soldiers and 343 sergeants.

Training Brigades

The armor training brigade at the Maneuver Center of Excellence,
Fort Benning, Georgia, conducts One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for
both tankers and scouts.14 The training lasts roughly 16 weeks for either
skill and currently produces 1,440 tankers per year after 12.7 percent
attrition and 2,340 scouts after 14.1 percent attrition.15 Additional
capacity, added in the summer of 2017, should increase the total
graduates per year to 1,920 tankers and 2,748 scouts.16 Given modest
12      Hornick, Burkhart, and Shunk, “Rightsizing the Army,” 43.
13       The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) concluded the Army
“could not provide [the Commission with] a formal plan for expanding the Army.” See NCFA,
Force Generation (FG) Subcommittee Monthly Meeting (Arlington, VA: NCFA, October 21, 2015), briefing
slides, 7.
14      The armor training brigade includes one armor battalion and one cavalry squadron.
15      Armored brigade commander, email messages to author, February 13–14, 2017.
16      Ibid.
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additional resources, the existing brigade infrastructure could support
three additional companies to train such soldiers.17 The infantry training
brigade graduates 12,900 infantry per year after a typical attrition of
14 percent.18 With classes filled to normal capacity, the brigade could
graduate 19,300 infantry per year; however, it could produce 21,100
graduates under surge conditions.19
Given overage and current rates of attrition, the Maneuver Center
of Excellence would be required to start training for 342 tankers, 352
scouts, and 685 infantry to fill one armored BCT. At current rates of
throughput, Fort Benning could train sufficient tankers for 1.23 armored
BCTs, enough scouts for 1.4 armored BCTs, and enough infantry for 4.15
armored BCTs per quarter. Should the Army return the two mechanized
infantry companies it removed from the armored BCT structure in 2017,
it could only generate 3.1 armored BCTs per quarter. This rate builds 1.7
infantry BCTs per quarter. Should additional replacement requirements
be necessary due to combat losses, the Army could either activate the
existing surge capacity at Fort Benning or use the National Guard’s
system of Regional Training Institutes to train additional soldiers.
Newly-formed brigades will not have the time or skills to train soldiers
on many essential tasks, such as drivers’ licensing, job-specific skills,
and combat lifesaver training, which are usually left to a new soldier’s
first unit. To form BCTs rapidly, OSUT could be lengthened; thereby,
economies of scale and experienced instructors could be leveraged to
conduct such training prior to soldiers arriving at newly-formed BCTs.

Noncommissioned Officers

A sufficient quantity of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would
not likely be available to fill more than 1 or 2 armored BCTs per quarter.
Accordingly, manning the NCO ranks in brigades requires multiple
solutions such as training potential leaders identified during initial
training, cross-leveling experience from existing brigades, recalling
experienced leaders to active duty, and employing contractors or other
nondeployable leaders in the generating force.
Sergeants. Sergeants serve as fire-team leaders and vehicle gunners
while providing first-level leadership in their platoons. An armored BCT
requires 87 tanker, 52 scout, and 135 infantry sergeants with an overage
totaling 343 sergeants.
One primary source of sergeants would be reminiscent of the
Vietnam War’s Noncommissioned Officer Candidate’s Course, which
produced sergeants from soldiers who demonstrated promise during
basic training. One model involves sending the top 25 percent of each
graduating OSUT class immediately to a modified Basic Leader Course.
This course would focus, first, on small unit leadership, followed
by several weeks of training specific to the soldier’s field and rank,
including tactics, maintenance, and gunnery.20 These new NCOs would
17      Ibid.
18      G-3 Training staff member, Maneuver Center of Excellence, email messages to the author,
February 22 and February 27, 2017.
19      Ibid.
20       Required percentages differ significantly depending on the needs of armor, scout, and infantry organizations, combined with the unknown variable of how many other sources are providing
soldiers to train as sergeants.
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be effectively prepared for leadership and receive a different brigade
assignment than their peers from initial training. While most of these
NCOs would join the newly-forming brigades, some would also report
to existing units to allow experienced NCOs to cross-level to the
new brigades.
Midgrade and Senior NCOs. The biggest personnel challenge of
generating brigade combat teams is filling midgrade and senior NCO
ranks with experienced leaders while maintaining existing brigades and
meeting the requirements of the generating force. An armored BCT
requires 42 tanker, 47 scout, and 80 infantry staff sergeants with an
overage total of 211. The distribution of sergeants first class equates to
23 tankers, 12 scouts, and 26 infantry, an overage total of 76. Master
sergeants and command sergeants major fill 17 tanker or scout billets
and 13 infantry slots with an overage total of 38. Given the performance
of midgrade NCOs during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite
deferring NCO education, the Army might accept the risk of rapid
promotion in a cross-leveling strategy, which might also favor technical
or tactical training over leadership courses.21 Nevertheless, the Master
Gunner’s School is an essential course to ensure the master gunners within
the armored BCT are indeed combat vehicle weapons systems experts.22

Officers

The unique roles, responsibilities, and training requirements for,
as well as the smaller numbers of, officers means every effort should
be made for them to complete all professional military education and
training requirements to support the brigade’s aimpoint.
Lieutenants. Except for the two-year option for Cadet Initial Entry
Training through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, there is no way
to accelerate commissioning through a university. Therefore, Officer
Candidate School will be the primary source for lieutenants—1,080
graduates per year—for the first two to four years of an Army expansion
effort.23 With five months’ notice, the school could expand its courses
and increase the number of graduates to 3,200 officers.24 The Army
National Guard also has substantial officer-training capacity.25
After initial training, all lieutenants would attend the armor or
infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, which is the minimum training
required to lead a platoon. In 19 weeks, these courses respectively graduate
480 and 1,440 officers per year with additional capacities of 840 and
21      Some examples of alternate training include Ranger School, the Tank Commander
Certification Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Mortar Leaders Course, Mechanized Leaders
Course, Stryker Leaders Course, and Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course.
22      The authorization is for a master gunner at each tank and infantry company, plus tank and
Bradley master gunners at both the battalion and brigade levels. The squadron is authorized one
master gunner at the squadron level and one for the tank company, but a Bradley master gunner is
not authorized at the troop level. For more details, see FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division,
and subordinate units; accessed February 18, 2017).
23      “Army ROTC: Army ROTC Leader Development: Cadet Initial Entry Training,” US Army,
March 17, 2016, http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/courses-and-colleges/curriculum/cadet-initial-entry
-training.html; and regimental commander, email message to author, December 9 and 16, 2016.
24      Battalion commander, email.
25      Essentially every state and some territories conduct Officer Candidate School at their Regional
Training Institute. Most states currently conduct 2–3 small classes of 10–20 students per year. For
one example, see “Officer Candidate School: Apply: OCS Program Dates,” Alabama National
Guard, December 19, 2016, http://al.ng.mil/ALABAMA/Careers/OCS/Pages/OCS_Apply.aspx.
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2,200 students.26 A new armored BCT would require, with overage, 76
junior lieutenants—33 armor officers filling armor or cavalry billets, 19
infantry officers, and 9 more from either branch. A secondary manning
requirement for 51 junior lieutenants would be created per brigade to
replace senior lieutenants or newly-promoted captains assigned to the
Maneuver Captain’s Career Course during the expansion. The combined
output of the armor and infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course are
sufficient to fill three armored BCTs per quarter.
Most new officers attend unit-specific training such as the Army
Reconnaissance Course, Bradley Leaders Course, Stryker Leaders
Course, Airborne School, Ranger School, or the Mortar Leader Course
after completing the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Thus, training
for a new infantry or armor officer lasts 9–12 months.27 Despite the
need to build brigades and the risks associated with selecting scout or
mortar platoon leaders prior to their arrival at the unit, new lieutenants
must continue to receive this training before they are assigned to their
brigades as such opportunities after arriving will be limited. Other
positions, such as executive officer, require more experience and should
be filled from existing brigades.
Captains. The 51 senior lieutenants or newly promoted captains
required to man a new armored BCT would include 15 armor, 12
infantry, and 14 officers from either branch. The secondary manning
requirement would replace 15 senior captains departing their brigades to
attend the Command and General Staff College. During the last decade,
unit commanders have typically hesitated to send their senior lieutenants
to the Captain’s Career Course; however, immediate completion of
this program would be essential to building new brigades. With the
majority of captains stabilized, the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course,
which currently achieves 800 graduates per year, can build 2.75 new
armored BCT’s per quarter while allowing for attrition.28 The primary
concern arises from the resultant loss of experience among captains
who will serve as company commanders or fill battalion and brigade
staffs. Sequentially building new armored BCTs mitigates such loss by
spreading it over time and across units.
Majors. Unlike the other officer grades, there is a large population
of senior captains and majors serving in nonessential positions such as
graduate school students, instructors, or other broadening assignments.
Each brigade would require 10 armor or infantry majors to be trained
and assigned as the operations and executive officers in the brigade and
its four maneuver battalions. Typically, such officers are graduates of
the one-year resident Command and General Staff College program or
the fourteen-week Intermediate Level Education. Subject to training
requirements, these officers could rapidly fill the required billets in a
new brigade.
Closed during World War I to ensure officers were available for
the war, the Command and General Staff College continued training
during World War II, graduating more than 19,000 staff officers in 27
26      Battalion commander, Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, email message to author,
December 16, 2016.
27      Cavalry squadron commander, email message to author, December 7, 2016.
28      G-3 Training staff member, email.
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shortened staff courses that closely resembled the current Intermediate
Level Education timeline.29 By shortening the resident program and
conducting multiple iterations per year, enough field grade officers could
be trained to form leadership cohorts for the new armored BCTs.
Commanders. The typically low selection rate for command at the
battalion and brigade levels leaves a significant population of available
high-quality lieutenant colonels and colonels. In the first year of
expansion, alternates from the most recent command select lists could
be selected for the authorizations of one colonel to command each
brigade and four lieutenant colonels to lead the maneuver battalions.
In subsequent years, the command select list would align with manning
requirements. The increased number of commands could impact the
ability to fill senior staff positions at and above the corps level, but this
deficiency could be offset by deferring retirements.
The Army already conducts a general Pre-Command Course at Fort
Leavenworth and a Maneuver Pre-Command Course at Fort Benning.
By combining both courses at Fort Leavenworth and scheduling them
in conjunction with Intermediate Level Education cohorts scheduled for
the same new brigades, the Army could incorporate some basic planning
exercises into the course while simultaneously building the command
teams for each brigade.
The Army retains significant training capacity in the states’ Regional
Training Institutes, many of which currently possess armor, cavalry,
and infantry military occupational specialty qualification and NCO
education programs.30 If this capacity was unnecessary, the institutes
could disband and either support building the cadre for new armored
BCTs or replace leaders in the generating force who could then fill
armored BCT positions.

Brigade Combat Team

On the identified activation date, trained soldiers and leaders would
converge on a designated location, whether the infrastructure of a
deployed armored BCT, a recently deactivated one, or a mobilization
force generation installation capable of housing and supporting the
entire brigade’s training regimen.31 The first five brigades might be
partially equipped from the five Army prepositioned stock fleets or from
existing units’ idle stay-behind equipment. Subsequent brigades would
have to wait for new equipment to be procured.
Two potential sources of cadre exist around which to build brigades.
First, the Army has six combined arms training brigades with the mission
of training and mobilizing the Army National Guard. Combined arms
training brigades, consist of commanders and rudimentary staffs at
29      John W. Partin, ed., A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth 1827–1983 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 37, 41.
30      A typical example of a state’s capability is the Pennsylvania Army National Guard’s 166th
Regiment, which currently offers military occupational specialty qualification for armor, scouts, and
infantry as well as the Basic Leadership Course for NCOs. See “166th Regiment,” Pennsylvania
Army National Guard, November 6, 2017, http://www.png.pa.gov/army_national_guard/166th
_regiment/Pages/default.aspx.
31        Mobilization Force Generation Installations have varying capacity in training areas and
housing. As of 2015, there are only three such installations capable of housing more than 4,000
soldiers at the same time: Fort Stewart, Georgia; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Camp Shelby,
Mississippi. For more details, see “White Paper: CATB to ABCT Conversion.”
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the battalion and brigade levels, and company training teams with a
team chief and a cadre of NCOs. In the event that the National Guard’s
brigades are already mobilized, those training brigades could form the
nucleus of the first five armored BCTs. Using the training brigades would
allow time to identify, train, and assemble soldiers, junior NCOs, and
officers, as well as the entire cavalry squadron, to form the next brigades.
The 1st Army conducted a feasibility study of this concept in 2015,
concluding it would be possible.32 Secondly, in similar fashion, the Army
is currently planning to form six security force assistance brigades. Like
the combined arms training brigades, these brigades consist of a cadre
of leaders and staff, without a full complement of enlisted soldiers and
junior NCOs, around which a brigade combat team might be formed.

Training Model

A 37-week battalion training model that concentrates on combined
arms maneuver in a contemporary operating environment and culminates in a combat training center exercise, would enable newly-formed
armored BCTs to achieve initial proficiency in brigade maneuver.33
Because the training progression would require four maneuver battalions
to rotate through key training resources, particularly live-fire ranges, a
minimum of 40 weeks would be required to sequence all four units
through the training. The following schedule for each battalion rotation
also includes “white space” for retraining and equipment maintenance.
The model does not provide for training in stability operations or other
nonessential skills.
During Week 1, soldiers initiate administrative inprocessing, draw
their equipment, and start to build teams. The next five weeks include
individual and basic collective task training, and also a two-week
leader training program and command post exercise. Week 7 involves
a situational training exercise on chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear scenarios, which is followed by crew drills and maneuver at
the fire team and squad levels in Week 8. Week 9 is allocated for unit
needs, while Weeks 10 and 11 focus on tactical training and platoon
battle drills. Week 12 is another week of white space for recovery or
additional training.
Weeks 13–16 include fire team and squad live fire exercises and crew
qualification on all stabilized and unstabilized systems, culminating
in platoon gunnery table XII. Another week of unit recovery or
retraining time occurs before the company-level situational training
exercises during Weeks 18 and 19; a company-level live-fire exercise
and battalion-level fire coordination exercise happen during Week 20.
Another unplanned training period is available in Week 21. Weeks 22
and 23 include a battalion command post exercise followed by battalion
situational training exercises. Finally, while soldiers recover and prepare
unit equipment for deployment to a combat training center, unit leaders
participate in an armored BCT command post exercise that occurs
during Week 24.
32      “CATB to ABCT Conversion.”
33      This training model is informed primarily by my professional opinion as a combined arms
battalion commander for two years, as well as a task force senior maneuver trainer at the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany, for two years.
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At this point, the unit has another week to prepare for the combat
training center deployment, which occurs during Week 26. Training at
the center—which might be the National Training Center, the Joint
Readiness Training Center, or a similar local training area, if necessary—
lasts through Week 30. The unit returns to its home station during Week
31 and conducts recovery, retraining, and semiannual or annual services
on vehicles and equipment through Week 34. The unit conducts block
leave during Weeks 35 and 36 and becomes operationally capable in
Week 37.
While the required training time is fixed, the total time required
to grow new brigades will vary based on such factors as mobilizing
the Army National Guard, vacating the mobilization force generation
installations, forward-deploying units to the Army prepositioned stock
fleet, building complete equipment sets, and initiating a steady flow
of new soldiers, as well as locating, transferring, and training initial
unit cadre.
Even building the first brigades around the experienced and
intact combined arms training brigades from 1st Army would require
augmentation with the entire cavalry squadron and with staff sergeants
from either the generating force or the existing brigades. Officer billets
could be filled by courses already underway. For the first brigades to
form, the force would be dependent upon whether a Basic Leadership
Course for sergeants was underway and how far along the various OSUT
courses might be in training. A fully-trained enlisted force might not
be available for four to six months. Moreover, the assembled force
would require about nine more months of training to be minimally
ready. Subsequently formed brigades would be more limited by the
ability to generate a cadre of experienced midgrade leaders once the
flow of enlisted and junior NCOs was established. Once prepositioned
equipment was issued, the rate of forming armored brigades would be
wholly dependent upon procuring additional matériel.

Risks

Although individual armored BCT’s can be built rapidly, there is risk
in doing so. Primarily, the entire force would lack experience. Existing
brigades would not only release many of their most experienced leaders,
but would also acquire inexperienced replacements. New brigades would
receive some experienced cadre, but many of those soldiers would likely
be inexperienced in their new billets or ranks.
A recent study described the practice of keeping a small Army that is
rapidly expansible in a time of war as “a flawed approach.”34 The primary
reason 30 months are required to build a brigade combat team is for
experience. Currently, soldiers at the unit level average five years in service,
while historically, draftees and volunteers alike spent two years in service.35
Considering the increasingly complex battlefield and equipment, there
is no replacement for experience. Nevertheless, this proposal would
generate brigades with experience measured in months, not years.
34      John R. Evans Jr., Getting it Right: Determining the Optimal Active Component End Strength of
the All-Volunteer Army to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century (Washington DC: Brookings Institute,
2015), 21.
35      Ibid.

98

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

The junior leaders from the Vietnam War were a mass-produced
expedient to face the pressing needs of that war. They were not trained
to be professional and long-serving leaders, but a short-term source of
combat leadership. While they did lead well on the battlefield, they lacked
the ability to provide mature leadership in garrison. The young sergeants,
in particular, were trained to be “good enough to win the war” but were
given almost no instruction in discipline or garrison leadership.36 Recall
the lesson in the Army’s previous attempt to build more effective and
cohesive units that continued to train together as Cohesion, Operational
Readiness, and Training units; when average leaders were placed under
time constraints and high pressure to form a unit rapidly based on
inexperienced soldiers, “vertical” cohesion actually suffered.37
Historically, when the Army expands, it is also forced to lower
standards for recruitment and retention. Struggling with recruitment
during the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army
reduced standards to allow up to four percent of recruits in Category IV
of the Armed Forces, the lowest aptitude category, to enter the service.38
Currently, 71 percent of American youth do not meet standards for
service, and the trend is getting worse.39 Lowering these standards creates
both discipline and performance problems. Disciplinary problems will
be worsened by the fact that most soldiers’ first line supervisors will be
inexperienced junior sergeants barely months ahead of those they are
leading. One of many examples of the risks posed to performance by
lower quality soldiers is stark. Given the same training as tank gunners,
soldiers categorized as IIIA (scoring in the 50th to 64th percentile on the
Armed Force Qualification Test) scored 34 percent better on the test than
did soldiers categorized as IV (scoring in the 10th to 30th percentile).40
The last risk is to mission success. While it is mathematically
possible to push the right numbers of soldiers through training, promote
them, assign them a billet, and propel them through a modicum of
training, they still lack the proficiency and lethality gained only through
multiple iterations in diverse conditions associated with day and night
operations in inclement weather and during chemical conditions. Failing
to train soldiers for proficiency, particularly when combined with the
performance of lower-quality recruits, is disastrous.

Recommendations

Although the Army may not decide to double the number of brigade
combat teams right now, multiple brigade combat teams may need to be
added as part of a future Army expansion. For that reason, the Army
should consider the following recommendations:
36      Lee M. North, The United States Army and the Sergeant Problem: The Army’s Systemic Inability To
Produce Enough Sergeants and a Proposal To Fix It (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and
General Staff College, 2014), 26.
37      Kenneth C. Scull, Cohesion: What We Learned from COHORT, Study Project (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: US Army War College, 1990), 22–23.
38       Anna Badkhen, “Army Relaxes Its Standards To Fill Ranks / Critics Say Push To Meet
Quotas May Let Unstable Recruits Join Up,” SFGate (San Francisco), July 11, 2006.
39       Blake Stilwell, “Here’s Why Most Americans Can’t Join the Military,” Business Insider,
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Link the generating force to the Total Army Analysis process.
Codify a minimum number of brigade combat teams to be supported
immediately from the generating force. Grow the generating force
to support expansibility.
Assign battle roster identification numbers to the expansible force.
Add a designation for expansible battalion and brigade commanders
on the Command Select List as a category separate from principals
or alternates. Build the expansible force’s battle roster to the extent
possible, including coding soldiers in the generating force to specific
duty positions in the expansible brigades. Compare the generating
force’s capacity against battle-rostered cadre and identify manning
solutions for any shortfalls.
Formally task the combined arms training brigades and security
force assistance brigades with a wartime mission as the cadre of
expansible brigades.
Assess current and surge capacity at active and reserve
component schools against expansibility goals with, and without,
stop-loss in effect. Assess all centers of excellence and state regional
training institutes. Capture costs and infrastructure requirements to
generate excess training capacity at incremental increases of 10, 25,
and 50 percent.
Adjust personnel policies to support expansibility. Enable
recalling experienced soldiers who have not met their individual
ready reserve commitment or who have retired. Assign battle-roster
numbers for those soldiers. Code these soldiers to specific duty
positions in the expansible brigades. Encourage national, state, or
local programs focused on the health and fitness of America’s youth.
Maintain prepositioned BCT equipment sets consistent with
Total Army Analysis goals. Reset sufficient combat vehicles in depots
or long-term storage. Procure and store all equipment necessary
to equip sufficient brigade combat teams. Build additional Army
prepositioned stock capability in both armored and Stryker Brigades.
The Army’s 2013 Strategic Guidance reads: “The Army must
preserve options for the future by retaining the capacity to expand
and provide the capabilities needed for future challenges.”41 Clearly,
the Army identified the risks assumed by cutting the force structure,
particularly in the generating force. Given fiscal realities, however, the
Army is currently operating at the edge of efficiency—sufficient capacity
to maintain the Army we have, but not the one we might need.
Secretary Gates may be right when he says we have seen the last
major combat involving large mechanized formations; then again,
he also said our record of predicting future war is perfect—we have
always been wrong! Regardless, should America identify the need for a
large Army, we will not have the luxury of time. It is, therefore, in the
Army’s—and the nation’s—best interests to minimize the time required
to build brigade combat teams.
41      Raymond T. Odierno and John M. McHugh, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 (Washington
DC: HQDA, 2013), 15.

